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Abstract
Background: Influenza pandemics have significant operational impact on deployed military personnel working in
areas throughout the world. The US Department of Defense global influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance network
serves an important role in establishing baseline trends and can be leveraged to respond to outbreaks of respiratory
illness.
Objective: We identified and characterized an operationally unique outbreak of H3N2 influenza at Camp Lemonnier,
Djibouti occurring simultaneously with the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 [A(H1N1)pdm09].
Methods: Enhanced surveillance for ILI was conducted at Camp Lemonnier in response to local reports of a possible
outbreak during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic. Samples were collected from consenting patients presenting with ILI
(utilizing a modified case definition) and who completed a case report form. Samples were cultured and analyzed
using standard real-time reverse transcriptase PCR (rt-RT-PCR) methodology and sequenced genetic material was
phylogenetically compared to other published strains.
Results: rt-RT-PCR and DNA sequencing revealed that 25 (78%) of the 32 clinical samples collected were seasonal
H3N2 and only 2 (6%) were A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza. The highest incidence of H3N2 occurred during the month of
May and 80% of these were active duty military personnel. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that sequenced H3N2
strains were genetically similar to 2009 strains from the United States of America, Australia, and South east Asia.
Conclusions: This outbreak highlights challenges in the investigation of influenza among deployed military
populations and corroborates the public health importance of maintaining surveillance systems for ILI that can be
enhanced locally when needed.
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Introduction
Respiratory illnesses, including influenza, contribute to a
large disease burden in military settings. Deployed military
personnel are at an increased risk of acquiring respiratory
diseases, which are a significant threat due to historically high
attack rates, rapid onset and difficulty controlling transmission
in austere and crowded environments [1]. Despite high
vaccination rates, influenza outbreaks with significant
operational impact do occur [2]. It has been shown that
deployed military personnel played an important role in the
global spread of disease during the influenza pandemic of
1918-1919 [3]. During the H1N1 influenza A pandemic of 2009
[A(H1N1)pdm09], outbreaks among military personnel were
quickly identified [4-6], reflecting the rapid global spread of
disease. This early identification may reflect the effects of
enhanced surveillance among military populations [7].
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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) conducts
surveillance for influenza-like illness (ILI) among US personnel
through a network of military bases in the United States and
worldwide. This networked surveillance system collects
epidemiological data and clinical specimens from patients
presenting for a variety of illnesses. Collected data and
specimens are fed into a centralized reporting system
constituting part of a global surveillance network shared with
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It is
through this surveillance network that clusters of respiratory
illness in various settings are detected, and a global snapshot
of influenza trends, particularly regarding circulating and
emerging strains, is developed [8,9]. This DoD surveillance
system can be leveraged to investigate and respond to
potential outbreaks at non-network military sites.
In this article we describe an operationally unique outbreak
of H3N2 influenza identified during the A(H1N1)pdm09
pandemic at a remote, non-networked US military base in East
Africa, detail the genetic characterization of the influenza virus
strains isolated, and highlight some of the unique aspects of
influenza surveillance in deployed military settings.
Materials and Methods
Setting
Camp Lemonnier is a US military multiservice base in
Djibouti which currently functions as the only fixed US base on
the African continent. US military members live primarily on
base (with some off-base privileges) and non-Djiboutian
contractors also frequently live on base or in the local
community. Several hundred locally employed host nationals
work within the base and typically commute from residences
within the surrounding local community. There is a continuous
rotation of approximately 25-75 service members arriving from
or departing to the US every 2-3 weeks. The Camp serves a
considerable area of operation where security and capacity-
building activities are conducted in the Horn of Africa and other
areas of East Africa. During the months of April and May 2009,
coinciding with the early stages of the A(H1N1)pdm09
pandemic [10], there was an anecdotal increase in reporting of
respiratory illness at Camp Lemonnier and concern was raised
as to whether these cases represented the beginning of a local
A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza outbreak. As a result of this
increased rate of respiratory illness and a desire to identify the
etiology and scope of illness, enhanced surveillance for ILI
cases was performed at the Expeditionary Medical Facility
(EMF) at Camp Lemonnier, the main clinic serving the
approximately 2,000 US service members and eligible US
contractors. At the request of EMF leadership, resources of the
US Naval Medical Research Unit-3 (NAMRU-3) in Cairo, Egypt
were leveraged to provide epidemiologic and laboratory
support.
Patient enrollment and historic medical review
In response to reports of increased respiratory illness,
surveillance for ILI was expanded by modifying the standard ILI
definition of cough and/or sore throat with fever (>100.4 °F) to
include complaints of subjective fever. Patients prospectively
identified through enhanced surveillance completed a case
report form on which demographic data, travel history, clinical
symptoms, and other relevant information was collected.
To characterize the baseline of ILI prior to the time of the
pandemic using the modified ILI definition, and to accurately
identify all possible ILI cases that may not have been
prospectively identified during the period of the suspected
outbreak, the electronic medical record system in the EMF was
queried to identify encounters of patients evaluated for
respiratory illnesses or viral syndromes beginning March 1,
2009. The narrative medical records of identified patients were
reviewed to determine whether or not each met the criteria for
the modified definition of ILI. Data were extracted and imported
into a case report form consistent with forms utilized in the
EMF clinic for enhanced surveillance. We extracted data for
encounters through the end of August, 2009, the apparent
endpoint of the outbreak, after which time passive surveillance
for ILI was resumed using pre-existing criteria.
Sample collection and processing
Nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs or nasal wash samples were
collected only from patients identified prospectively during
enhanced surveillance. These were stored in viral transport
media at -70°C until tested. Preliminary testing of samples was
conducted at Camp Lemonnier by NAMRU-3 staff using a
Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID)
9200 PCR platform (Idaho Technology Inc, Salt Lake City, UT,
USA) with reagents and kits provided by NAMRU-3. RNA was
extracted from clinical specimens using the Qiagen QIAmp
Viral RNA Mini Kit protocol (Qiagen, Valencia, CA, USA),
extracted RNA was tested by real-time reverse transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction (rt-RT-PCR) using SuperScript® III
One-Step RT-PCR System with Platinum®Taq reagents and
primers and probes from the CDC Human Influenza Virus rt-
RT-PCR Detection and Characterization Panel [11]. Clinical
specimens were retested as described above and results were
confirmed at NAMRU-3 in Cairo, Egypt. Clinical specimens
were not obtained from patients identified retrospectively.
Virus isolation in cell culture
Clinical specimens were inoculated onto a monolayer of
Madin Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) (ATCC CCL-34) cells
following standard cell culture and virus isolation techniques.
The specimens were treated briefly with 5mg/ml gentamicin
and 1000 U/ml penicillin (GIBCO, Carlsbad, CA, USA) prior to
inoculation. Culture tubes with 80-90% confluent MDCK
monolayer were inoculated with 100µl of each sample in
growth media (DMEM with 2mM glutamine, 0.2% bovine serum
albumin, 100U/ml penicillin, 100µg/ml streptomycin, 50µg/ml
gentamicin, 2.5µg/ml amphotericin B and 2µg/ml TPCK
trypsin). The tubes were incubated at 37°C in 5% CO2 and
checked daily for 10 days for cytopathic effects (CPE). All
cultures were screened by hemagglutination and rt-RT-PCR to
detect viral presence. The obtained isolates were extracted for
RNA and aliquots were stored at -70°C for further analysis.
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RNA extraction and PCR
Extraction of RNA from culture isolates was performed using
the Qiagen QIAmp Viral RNA Mini Kit protocol (Qiagen)
followed by cDNA synthesis. 4µl of RNA was used with the Uni
12 universal primer [12] to generate the cDNA. The
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes were
amplified from the synthesized cDNA using specific primers
(Table 1) using the GeneAmp High Fidelity PCR system
protocol (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA). The HA
and NA obtained PCR products were visualized and purified by
electrophoresis through 1.5% agarose and the QIAquick Gel
Extraction kit (Qiagen). Those HA and NA genes from clinical
samples that did not result in virus isolation were amplified from
the extracted RNA previously described according to the CDC
Protocol for Amplification and Sequencing of Influenza Viruses
with M13 labeled primers as outlined by Deyde, et al.[15].
Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis
Cycle sequencing was performed using the BigDye
Terminator v3.1 Sequencing Kit (Applied Biosystems) and HA
and NA amplification primers as well as internal primers (Table
1) to cover the full length of the HA and NA genes. The
products of the sequencing reaction were purified using the
BigDye XTerminator Purification Kit and sequenced on an ABI
3130xl genetic analyzer (Applied Biosystems). Sequences
were edited and analyzed using Sequencher V4.10.1 (Gene
Codes, Ann Arbor, MI, USA). A nucleotide database search
was performed using blastN (basic local alignment search tool,
Nucleotide) in GenBank. Bioedit software [16] was used for
aligning the selected sequences. Phylogenetic and molecular
evolutionary analysis was performed on MEGA 4 software [17]
using the neighbor-joining method [18]. A maximum-likelihood
composite model for nucleotide substitution and bootstrap
analysis was implemented with 1000 replicates for sequence
comparison [19]. The nucleotide sequences of the HA and NA
genes isolated from influenza A H3N2 samples from this
outbreak were compared to those of other selected influenza A
H3N2 sequences from 2008 and 2009, available on GenBank,
Table 1. Primers used for identification and sequencing of
influenza strains.
Name Sequence Reference




H3HAR-792 CAG TAT GTC TCC CGG TTT CDC
H3HAR-1184 ATG GCT GCT TGA GTG CTT CDC
H3Forward AAG CAT TCC YAA TGA CAA ACC
CDC Diagnostic
Assay 2005 [14]
AH3 A (Inf A) CAGATTGAAGTGACTAATGC Stockton, 1998 [14]
N2-MD-F1 AGC AAA AGC AGG AGT GAA AAT G NAMRU-3
N2-MD-F500 CAA ACA AGT GTG CAT AGC ATG G NAMRU-3
N2-MD-F1000 GGA AAC CCA GGA GTG AAA GG NAMRU-3
N2-MD-R1300 ATG GAA CAG GCT CAT GGC NAMRU-3
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0082089.t001
in a tree rooted to the 2009 influenza vaccine strain (A/
Brisbane/10/2007).
Ethics statement
Data and clinical specimens were obtained under military
command approval as public health surveillance, with analysis
performed consistent with Department of Defense Directives
(DoDD) 6590.2 and DoDD 6490.02E and as non-research
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements in
accordance with US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
section 38 CFR 16 (‘‘The Common Rule’’). Identified health
data were securely transmitted, processed, and retained on
data systems compliant with DoD information assurance
policies.
Results
From March 1 to August 31, 2009, 65 patients that met the
modified ILI case definition were identified through enhanced
surveillance (n=32) or through electronic medical record review
(n=33). Overall, the median age was 32 years, and 57 (88%)
were active duty personnel (Table 2). Preliminary field
deployable PCR testing at the EMF revealed eight positive
influenza A samples in specimens collected through May 8,
2009. Through the end of the surveillance period nasal washes
or NP swabs were collected from a total of 32 patients and sent
to NAMRU-3 for processing. Of the 32 samples collected, 25
(78%) were confirmed as seasonal H3N2 influenza by rt-RT-
PCR and DNA sequencing. The majority of the H3N2 cases
(n=20, 80%) were among active duty military with the
remainder of cases from US contractors. The mean duration of
symptoms prior to clinic visit was 2.5 days. Fourteen (56%)
patients reported having been in close contact (within 6 feet) to
a person with similar symptoms within the past 14 days and 8
(32%) patients reported having resided in a location outside
Djibouti and the US for at least 24 hr during the deployment
period. Figure 1 shows the frequency of ILI cases (meeting
either standard or modified ILI definition) during the
surveillance period. The initial H3N2 cases occurred in March
and the highest incidence (based on an assumed stable base
population) of laboratory-confirmed H3N2 seasonal influenza
occurred during the month of May. Only two cases (6%) of
confirmed A(H1N1)pdm09 (GenBank accessioning numbers:
CY062432, CY062404) were identified throughout the
surveillance period ending on August 31, 2009. All patients
included in this study responded positively to conservative
outpatient treatment and recovered without complications.
We were able to obtain nine full-length HA gene sequences
(GenBank accessioning numbers: : CY062329, CY062330,
CY062331, CY062332, CY062333, KF626520, KF626521,
KF626522, KF626523)and eight full-length NA gene
sequences (GenBank accessioning numbers: KF626512,
KF626513, KF626514, KF626515, KF626516, KF626517,
KF626518, KF626519) from culture isolates of the 25 H3N2
positive clinical specimens (Figures 2 and 3). Comparison of
the amino acid sequences of the HA gene from these isolates
to the 2009 vaccine strain (A/Brisbane/10/2007) revealed
seven amino acid differences: K158N, K173Q, V186G, N189K,
2009 H3N2 Influenza Outbreak in Djibouti
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N190D, T212A, and I362R. Phylogenetic reconstruction was
performed using influenza sequences from this outbreak and
H3N2 strains circulating worldwide between 2008 and 2009
Table 2. Patient characteristics for influenza-like illness (ILI)
and laboratory confirmed H3 cases.
 ILI cases Lab confirmed H3
Patient Demographics, n (%) 65 (100) 25 (100)
Age group, n (%)*     
18 - 25 14 (22) 3 (12)
26 - 37 24 (37) 14 (56)
38 and older 24 (37) 8 (32)
Median age (IQR)** 32 (27,41) 37 (32,43)
Male gender, n (%) 53 (82) 24 (96)
Active duty personnel, n (%) 57 (88) 20 (80)
Median time (days) from illness onset to clinic
visit (IQR)
2 (1,3) 3 (1,4)
Travel history, n (%)† 7 (11) 8 (32)
Sick contacts, n (%)‡ 7 (11) 6 (24)
Clinical symptoms at presentation, n (%) 65 (100) 25 (100)
Subjective fever 58 (89) 17 (68)
Documented fever§ 18 (28) 8 (32)
Cough 51 (78) 20 (80)
Sore throat 32 (49) 7 (28)
Body aches 27 (42) 13 (52)
Rhinorrhea 20 (31) 6 (24)
Headache 19 (29) 10 (40)
Diarrhea and/or vomiting 6 (9) 3 (12)
Pneumonia 1 (2) 0 (0)
* Three patients did not disclose age
** Inter-quartile range
† Defined as residing in a location outside Djibouti and the US for at least 24 hr
during the deployment period
‡ Defined as close contact (within 6 feet) to a person with similar symptoms within
the past 14 days
§ Defined as a clinically measured temperature >100.4°F
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0082089.t002
Figure 1.  Incidence of ILI cases and confirmatory
laboratory results by rt-RT-PCR, March 1- August 31,
2009.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0082089.g001
(Figures 2 and 3). Analysis revealed that the HA gene
sequences from the Camp Lemonnier isolates cluster together
in a monophyletic group with genetic structures similar to 2009
strains from California, New York, Thailand, Australia, India,
Nanjing, and Managua. They also cluster with strains from
Uganda collected in July 2009 (CY087697 A/Uganda/
MUXRP-061/2009 2009/07), and strains from Kenya and Egypt
collected in October and December 2009 (HM 347426 A/
Kenya/0070/2009 2009/10/30, CY062346 A/Egypt/
N12479/2009 2009/12). These clusters were also not distantly
separated from other influenza branches including the 2009
isolates from Novosibirsk, Ghana, and Lebanon. Analysis of
the sequenced NA genes from the Djibouti influenza isolates
revealed that none contained any of the established markers
(E119V, R292K, and N294S) known to confer resistance to the
neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) oseltamivir and zanamivir
[20-22].
Discussion
The ILI surveillance and outbreak investigation at Camp
Lemonnier is of particular interest for several reasons. Given
the timing of the outbreak with the emergence of
A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza in North America in the Spring of
2009, and as Camp Lemonnier has a large flux of US military
coming to and from the US, there were geopolitical concerns of
introducing A(H1N1)pdm09 into areas where it had not yet
been reported (and in areas where active screening of travelers
was being conducted). Interest in preventing the potential
spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 into the host nation of Djibouti as
well as the uncertainty of its true clinical severity of illness led
to heightened interest in identifying (and confirming) influenza
cases, which in turn enhanced existing passive surveillance
efforts. Such enhanced surveillance identified a cluster of
seasonal H3N2 circulating in a predominantly US-based
deployed population in Djibouti and identified the first reported
lab-confirmed cases of A(H1N1)pdm09 in Djibouti. Success in
identifying etiologic agents of this outbreak, initially believed to
be a cluster outbreak of A(H1N1)pdm09, was in part due to the
ability of staff at EMF to leverage and enhance a pre-existing
passive surveillance system and to engage the support of a
regional DoD reference laboratory (NAMRU-3) in outbreak
response. On-site enhanced laboratory diagnostic capabilities
would not only improve the sensitivity and specificity of
surveillance systems in locations such as Djibouti but would
also improve outbreak response and investigation.
It is important to note that 26% of the H3N2 cases identified
in this cluster were among US contractor personnel who may
live and interact within the local community and who are
typically assigned to the base longer than active duty service
members deployed for a period of only 6-12 months.
Additionally, the fact that several of the patients infected with
H3N2 (or A(H1N1)pdm09) influenza during the outbreak did not
report travel history within seven days of symptom onset
suggests that secondary transmission of both strains was
occurring on the base. Secondary transmission on Camp
Lemonnier is also supported by the sequenced HA genes from
2009 H3N2 Influenza Outbreak in Djibouti
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the H3N2 isolates obtained from the base having 100% identity
to one another.
It is well established that influenza A (H3N2) viruses
circulating between continents may seed epidemics in areas
with established travel and trade infrastructure [23]. It is
possible that the origin for the circulating viral strains in this
epidemic may have been from cases with recent but
unreported travel to areas of overlapping epidemics in South
East Asia, a frequent destination of Camp Lemonnier active
duty military staff and US contractors. Interestingly, unique
characteristics of the influenza A H3N2 viruses circulating in
2008 and 2009, including mutations in the gene sequences
coding neuraminidase proteins contributing to resistance to
oseltamivir [24] and impacting the specificity of receptor binding
[25] were not identified in our isolates.
It is also important to note that very limited data exist in
regard to the seasonal aspect of influenza transmission in the
Horn of Africa [26]. Global enhanced surveillance during the
pandemic demonstrated considerable “off-season”
transmission of influenza A viruses [27]. In other regions of the
world, transmission of 2009 pandemic influenza has been
shown to be similar to that of seasonal influenza in many
aspects including similar sensitivities to temperature and
humidity [28]. Co-circulation of A(H1N1)pdm09 and seasonal
H3N2 influenza viruses led to mixed infections, with emergence
of A(H1N1)pdm09 as the predominant strain, suggesting this
viral strain has enhanced fitness [29]. In the outbreak we
investigated, however, we did not identify any co-infections with
A(H1N1)pdm09 or other seasonal influenza strains.
This article illustrates that deployed military personnel may
serve as sentinel populations to identify the global spread or
emergence of influenza strains. Due to crowding and other
local geographical and operational conditions deployed
personnel may be at higher risk for illness, and such military
Figure 2.  Phylogenetic analysis of H3N2 HA gene segments.  *Phylogenetic tree of influenza A/H3N2 using the Neighbor-
Joining method and Bootstrap test (1000 replicates). The evolutionary distances were computed using the Maximum Composite
Likelihood method. The phylogenetic tree was generated using MEGA4 software. Phylogenetic analysis rooted to the 2009
influenza vaccine strain (A/Brisbane/10/2007).
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0082089.g002
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conditions may also create the potential for widespread
transmission of influenza within the base population. As the US
military population is often deployed to regions where little data
exist on circulating influenza strains, surveillance can provide
important surrogate data on circulating strains. Insights into
influenza outbreak transmission dynamics from the global DoD
influenza surveillance network (especially if local reporting can
be performed in a timely manner) can be utilized at the local
level as a framework for addressing emerging public health
needs. In addition, as deployed US military members typically
have vaccination rates exceeding 90%, ongoing surveillance
among this population helps gauge vaccine effectiveness (and
cross-protection) and may detect novel strains circulating in
other regions of the world. Standardized reporting of
surveillance data to the global DoD influenza surveillance
network also ensures compliance with the International Health
Regulations of 2005. This outbreak corroborates the public
health importance of maintaining a simple, but flexible
surveillance system for ILI in deployed US military populations.
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